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A spectre is haunting Western Europe in the shape of
growing American and Japanese domination of the
strategic information technology (IT) sectors. Tele-
communications is the one IT sector in which the
position of the European Community (EC) countries
has been most favourable. A dozen or so indigenous
firms satisfy most of the requirements of the EC
market and, taken as a whole, the Community
represents 20 percent of the world telecommunications
market. This favourable position contrasts sharply
with the situation in microelectronic components and
data processing equipment. where the EC's position is
becoming ever more precarious. The EC countries'
traditional strength in the telecommunications sector
stems from the fact that this sector is severely
partitioned along national lines, a result ofchauvinistic
national procurement policies and a mosaïc of
nationally-specific technical standards. The most
distinctive feature of the telecom sector is that a public
agency. traditionally charged with sole responsibility
for the operation and regulation of the network.
dominates the market on the demand side, while a
small 'ring' of private firms dominate the supply side.
With the exception of defence arid agriculture, no
other sector has been so politicised and so protected.
Once a relatively stable sector in which institutional
arrangements went unquestioned, the tetecomniuni-
cations sector faces radical change on three fronts:
accelerating technological change; product markets
that arc becoming more interriationalised; and
institutional innovation in thc shape of deregulation,
at least in the US, the UK and .Japan. Overall, the
range and capacity of equipment attached to the
network has steadily increased, with the result that the
boundaries between telecommunications,. data pro-
cessing and office equipment are becoming less
discernable. The technological advances of the past
decade not only permit existing, 'first generation'
services to be upgraded hut, more importantly, they
signal that a new telecommunications infrastructure is
emerging, capable of providing 'second' and 'third'
generation services. [See Table I] Converging
technologies, together with the rise of new markets for
equipment and services, have fashioned an environ-
ment that is radically different from the delays when
the traditional regulatory regime was framed. Hence it
is argued that 'we have now reached a point where
technical, operational, demand and competitive
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changes have so dramatically emphasised the
limitations of the existing regulatory framework
that a new look at and approach to regulation
becomes a necessity' [Little 1983].
Accelerating technological change conl roms all the
EC member countries in equal measure. But what is
perhaps most striking is the fact that these
'imperatives' have met with quite different political
responses in Britain, France and West Germany. This
divergence constitutes the starting point of the
underlying argument iii this article: namely, that
technology and markets do not of themselves dictate
political or institutional forms, a point lost on
functionalist proponents of 'natural' technological
trajectories. However, the chief' aim here is to chart the
very different careers of the telecommunications
sector in Britain and France.
Britain: the Neo-Liberal Experiment
Under the Thatcher government Britain's experience
in telecommunications has been without precedent in
Western Europe. In no other country has tiheralisation
proceeded so far. No other country lias broken the
state's monopoly of the teleconlmLinications network.
Arid no other country lias privatised its national
carrier. Liherahisation, which needs to be distinguished
from privatisation, formally began in Britain in 1981,
when the teleconimunications function of the Post
Office was hived off and invested in the newly formed
British l'elecorn [BT]. Subsequently, the formerly
rigid rules governing equipment sales and value-added
network services [VANS] have been considerably
lihcraliscd. A rival company (Mercury, owned by
Cable and Wireless) has been licensed to run a new
telecommunications network. Two rival consortia
(one led by Bi, the other by Racal) have been
authorised to Operate cellular mobile radio networks.
And. in 1984, BT was privatised and subjected to a
new regulatory regime in the shape of the Office of
Telecommunications [Ofteh]. In conjunction these
changes mean that Britain's regulatory system is
among the most liberal in the world. Yet, radical as
these changes seem in the European context, the
Thatcher government could claim to be acting (in
part) upon the neglected recommendations of the 1977
Carier Committee, which cailed for modest liberali-
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sation in terminal equipment and for the separation of
posts and telecommunications. Even so, the govern-
ment can also claim to have ventured way beyond the
cautious Carter proposals by creating the nearest
thing to a 'little America' in Europe. However, the
British situation still falls far short of the apparent
'free-for-all' in the US.
A number of things have changed since the t,ahour
government refused to act upon the Carter proposals.
First and foremost, a radically different political party
assumed office in 1979, committed, inter alia. tci
extending the sovereignty of the pr/vate market.
Secondly, as more sophisticated equipment and
services became available, especially in the form of
private networks, business users became increasingly
frtistrated and more vocal about their inability to gain
access to them quickly enough: and BT showed no
apparent intention of introducing new equipment or
services other than at its own convenience. Finally, the
relationship between BT and its oligopolistic 'club' of
suppliers - GEC, Plessey and STC - inspired less
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confidence as time wore on, especially as regards
System X. Britain's family of digital switching
systems. which has yet to win a major overseas order.
Within this new conjuncture the Thatcher strategy had
a number of aims:
to create a more competitive market and a more
dynamic supply industry:
to boost the economy as a whole by allowing
business users to gain quicker access to a more
advanced teleeoTnmunications infrastructure;
to use privatisation as a means of reducing the
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement, which
was inflated by Bi' because the latter did not have
direct access to external financial markets.
Although Britain's basic telecommunications network
is still burdened with huge tracts of obsolete
equipment, and network modernisation still tags
behind France and West Germany, deregulation has
undoubtedly induced a spate of new services that are
less developed or else unavailable in these continental
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countries. For example, with some 600 VANS (e.g.
electronic mail, videotex networks) licensed in Britain
since 1981, more than in the whole of the rest of
Western Europe, Britain is set to remain the largest
European VANS market for some time. Similarly,
cellular radio has already been introduced in Britain,
whereas France and West Germany, being more
concerned to use indigenous technology, have yet to
install equivalent systems. However, while such
services represent very real gains for business users,
there are also costs attached to a strategy that puts
market-led demand before indigenous supply capacity.
Cellular radio provides a perfect example of this
dilemma. Because the Thatcher government set a
premium on rapid deployment, the hulk of the
technology and the associated equipment had to be
imported from the US, Japan and Sweden. Britain, it
seems, is more prepared than France and West
Germany to by-pass indigenous suppliers to gain
access to advanced telecommunications.
Furthermore, foreign multinationals now perceive
Britain to have the most attractive (i.e. liberal)
telecommunications market in Western Europe and
many of them, like Mitel, NEC, Northern Telecom
and Rolm, have chosen Britain as their chief location
in Europe. 1f this poses formidable problems for
indigenous British firms, it is perfectly compatible
with the Thatcher government's attempt to promote a
cosmopolitan, rather than a purely domestic, form of
re-industrialisation in Britain [Morgan and Sayer
1987].
It is already clear that deregulation is far from being a
boon for all the actors in the telecommunications
sector. Although BT itself did not foresee the extent of
deregulation, particularly as regards network com-
petition and privatisation, it has reacted with an
aggression that few thought possible in such a
bureaucratised organisation. Having fought - in vain
- against the formation of Mercury. BT appears to
have embraced privatisation with alacrity because it
allowed management to run BI as a relatively
autonomous company rather than as 'part of the
economy'. Beginning in 1982, BT's once monolithic
structure has been restructured into profit centres, and
it has embarked on its self-proclaimed mission to
become an international actor in information
processing and office automation. lo this end it is now
far more willing - and able - to forge international
alliances and to procure its equipment from suppliers
other than GEC. Plessey and SIC. SC) far BI's most
dramatic decision on the latter front has been its move
to source up to 20 per cent of its digital exchanges from
Thorn Ericsson, much to the chagrin of the indigenous
System X suppliers. Furthermore, BT is now hastily
re-balancing its tariffs to reduce cross-subsidies
between profitable business traffic and unprofitable
residential services. As a result tariffs for major
business users are decreasing. Indeed BI now has the
lowest business tariffs in Europe, a strategy designed
to entice multinationals into establishing their
telecommunications networks in Britain. These
changes have been facilitated by privatisation but, so
far as BT is concerned, they were actually necessitated
by Mercury's strategy of 'creaming off' business on
BT's most profitable trunk and international routes.
As far as the other sectoral actors are concerned BT's
traditional suppliers are opposed to aspects of the
deregulatory programme, while the unions are against
every bit of it. The principal supplier firms. GEC.
Plessey and SIC, had a long history of conflict among
themselves prior to the current conflict between them
and government over deregulation. For instance, as
regards development of System X, described by the
Carter Committee as Britain's 'make-or-break'
project in telecommunications, the Committee
observed that these firms were not a 'natural team'.
GEC and Plessey, for example, never fully endorsed
SIC as a legitimate collaborator in view of the latter's
ITT parent. Bitter corporate feuding and protracted
delays with System X eventually provoked BT, at the
behest of the government, to threaten that some 30 per
cent of digital exchange orders would be placed
overseas unless a more effective arrangement was
forthcoming. In the event. SIC was obliged to
withdraw from the System X programme in 1982,
albeit with exclusive contracts for the older
(TXE4/4A) exchanges, and Plessey emerged as
principal contractor with GEC as the sub-contractor,
On the question of deregulation itself, the opposition
from the traditional suppliers revolves around two
issues in particular. Firstly, that Britain is liberalising
its market without reciprocal arrangements elsewhere
in Europe. And secondly, that privatisation is simply
substituting a private monopoly for a public one, and
that this provides BI with a greater opportunity to
procure from overseas. Oftel judged that the first issue
was a legitimate cause for concern, but could only
recommend greater political action to promote
liberalisation abroad. On the second issue Oftel
offered little comfort, declaring that imperfect
competition was better than no competition. While
Oftel recommended that BI should limit second-
sourced digital exchanges to 20 per cent of the market
for three years - a suggestion alreadt rejected by BT
- it nevertheless approved second sourcing as the
only way to make competition a credible threat.
Unsettled and aggrieved, the major suppliers count
themselves among the victims of deregulation. They
are now subject to a more hostile sectoral regime: BI,
for so long a captive purchaser and therefore unable to
exercise its latent power, is imposing much tougher
procurement policies. For its part the government
dismisses the suppliers' grievances as the necessary, if
painful, costs of the transition to a more competitive
supplier industry. As a response to the deregulatory
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wave the major suppliers have accelerated their search
for corporate partners, in the US and in Europe, so as
to strengthen their international position and extend
their product range, especially in the computing side
of information technology. Because of this more
competitive environment, but also because of the
perceived need to command greater economies of
scale, GEC launched a major take-over bid for Plessey
at the end of 1985.
Significantly, GEC has also tried to enlist trade union
support in its opposition to BT's new procurement
policies. When in 1985 GEC announced 900
redundancies it claimed that these were, in part, a
direct consequence of BT's decision to 'go foreign' in
the field of digital exchanges. If this was indeed
calculated to accentuate 'buy British' demands from
its unions so as to pressurise government, it succeeded
on the former as conspicuously as it failed on the
latter. Nevertheless, job security remains the key issue
in trade union opposition to deregulation. BT's
workforce, which is still 'over-manned' compared to
the French DGl and the German Bundespost,
suffered a net decline of 17,000 in the three years to
1985 and equally heavy losses will continue until 1990.
Significant redundancies have been experienced too in
each of BT's major supplier firms over the past five
years. Telecommunications has been gripped by the
jobless growth tendencies all too evident in other
information technology sectors. Deregulation may be
hastening the displacement of labour - though this is
partly compensated for by additional employment
within newly established, foreign firms - but it is
neither the only nor the major cause. A more
fundamental threat to employment is the transition
from electro-mechanical exchanges, which are labour-
intensive on both production and maintenance, to
digital exchanges which are associated with a
numerically smaller, but higher skilled, workforce.
Such 'technological'job loss would be difficult to stem
without any deregulation. However, having failed to
prevent deregulation, the trade unions have now
placed their faith in the Labour Party, which is
pledged to renationalise BT if returned to office. Fully
aware of such a threat, the Thatcher government saw
'popular' shareholding as the best deterrent to
renationalisation. While the Labour Party is still
privately anxious on this score, the deterrent is not
what it was: within six months of privatisation, BT's
shareholders declined from 2.3 mn to less than 1.7 mn
and, of these, private investors account for only
13.7 per cent of BT's total shares. This political
prospectus means that the present institutional
character of British telecommunications is by no
means guaranteed a future.
Within the European context Britain's telecommuni-
cations sector has undergone a significant, and thus
far unique, institutional transformation. Aided and
abetted though it was by accelerating technological
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change and the advent of new markets, both of which
compromised the traditional state monopoly, this
transformation would not have been accomplished
were it not for resolute political action on the part of
the Thatcher government. Even so, we should not
exaggerate the extent to which competition now reigns
in Britain; not should we represent the Thatcher
government as being hell bent on promoting
competition or as having a unity of purpose. The truth
is more prosaic. At every turn the government has
been torn in two different, and somewhat contra-
dictory, directions with respect to liberalisation and
privatisation. Concerned to ensure that a 'privatised'
BI commanded the best possible price, the
government retreated from the more radical scenarios
of liberalisation canvassed by some of its members.
For instance, a proposal to dismember BI - along
the lines of the divestiture of AT & T - was
considered and abruptly rejected, partly because it
might have jeopardised the sale price, and partly
because it would have diluted the 'flagship' role of BT
vis-a-vis the British IT industry, an argument
successfully deployed by BT itself. Little wonder that
the British experiment is said to be inconsistent and
contradictory, with the government's allegiance
divided between BT's customers and its shareholders.
Notwithstanding the formation of Mercury, BT
continues to occupy a formidable position in the
British telecommunications sector. It possesses a de
facto monopoly over the local network up to 1990 and,
until then, Mercury will be its sole rival in long-
distance and international services. Furthermore, BT
has already established a large presence in markets
like large PABX's - that it did not address before
1983. And BI is already heavily involved in those
technologies, like cellular mobile radio and cable
television, that will eventually allow users to
circumvent the local network. Regulation of BT is
already stretching Oftel, whose powers are con-
siderably less than those of the Federal Communication
Commission in the US. While it is premature to assess
how successful Oftel will be, this much is clear:
regulatory policy will have to strike a balance between
(i) the government's desire to see BT function as a
'flagship' for the pedestrian IT industry and (ii) its
desire to placate critics who believe that BT is now
more able to abuse its market power. Time alone will
decide how this precarious balance is negotiated.
Finally, it is already apparent that the status of
telecommunications in Britain is shifting so that it is
less of a social, and more of a business service.
Deregulation has fashioned a new configuration of
winners and losers amongst suppliers and users. On
the supply side, as we have seen, BT's traditional
suppliers appear to be the major victims, and their
inability to exploit the opportunities afforded by
liberalisation has been a bitter disappointment to the
government. There is clearly an enormous difference
between deregulation in a context where one's
indigenous suppliers are strong (as in the US) and a
context (like Britain) where domestic suppliers are
relatively weak. Deregulation, like free trade,
privileges the strong, and it is no coincidence that
many of the world's leading telecommunications firms
have seleéted Britain as their chief European location.
On the user side, the major beneficiaries of
deregulation are large business users like financial
institutions and the multinationals. However, small
businesses and residential users are now experiencing
higher charges so that large business users can enjoy
discounts. Britain now has the dubious honour of
having some of the highest charges in Western Europe
for local calls, and the lowest charges for big business
users [Morgan 1987]. This growing inequality among
users is causing Oftel a good deal of anxiety; but it
could have been foreseen because this is exactly what
transpired in the US. Western Europe is now looking
closely at the British, rather than at the US,
deregulatory experience, because Britain is (or was)
institutionally more akin to the continental tele-
communications scene. At the moment, these
countries seem less willing to cede public control over
such a strategic sector as telecommunications. And
some, like the FRG, appear far less willing to accept
greater social inequality as the price to be paid for
'liberating' telecommunications.
France: the Scope and Limits of a State-Led
Strategy
Until recently it seemed that France had embarked on
a strategy that was the antithesis of the neo-liberal
path being pursued in Britain. The most conspicuous
divergence lay in the emphasis that France ascribed to
a state-led strategy in telecommunications. In 1982 the
two largest electronics groups, CGE and Thomson,
were nationalised by the socialist government, and
CGCT, the former ITT subsidiary, was added to the
publicly-owned list in the following year. Then, in
1982, the Plan Filière Electronique, an ambitious five-
year plan for the electronics industry, was launched in
the hope of using strong sectors (like telecommuni-
cations) as a lever for the development of weaker
sectors. Later, in 1983, CGE and Thomson initiated
an asset swop - sanctioned by the government -
with the result that CIT-Alcatel, a subsidiary ofCGE,
assumed sole responsibility for their merged tele-
communications activities, leaving Thomson to
specialise in semiconductors, consumer electronics
and military systems. The major rationale for these
changes was the desire to provide the leading firms
with sufficient public investment and economics of
scale to enable them to act as national champions at
home and abroad. However, without denying the logic
behind these events, the fact remains that the
telecommunications sector has been forced to contend
with the internal upheavals of rationalisation, merger
and a bewildering succession of industrial policy
shifts, as well as with the external reverberations of
deregulation in the US, Japan and Britain.
Before 1986 there was little or no public debate about
liberalisation in France. Two factors in particular
help to explain this state of affairs. Firstly, a bi-
partisan commitment to the traditional PTT model
effectively removed liberalisation from the political
agenda. Secondly, the DGT had incurred none of the
criticisms that were levelled against the British Post
Office in the 1970s. Rather, the DGT had earned itself
a prodigious reputation by resolving 'la crise du
téléphone'. Prior to the 1970s France had been
afflicted by an embarrassing paradox: its grand
technological ambitions appeared somewhat ridiculous
given the fact that it had one of the lowest telephone
densities in the OECD. However, on the basis of a
massive and belated public investment programme in
the l970s, the DGT transformed the French telephone
network from an embarrassing oddity into one of the
most efficient in Europe. At the same time, while
Britain and the FRG struggled with digital exchanges
in the l970s, France successfully managed to develop
and install the world's first fully digital exchange. For
these reasons the DGT had acquired something of a
'superstar' status in the industry and within the French
administration [Bertho 1981].
While liberalisation was emerging on the British
political agenda, the debate in France revolved around
the implications of the influential Nora-Minc report
[1978], which popularised the notion of 'telematics'
(i.e. the convergence of computers and tele-
communications). The unequivocal message of this
report was that France should establish a position of
international comparative advantage in telematics.
Furthermore, since France would face a tremendous
competitive challenge here from the likes of IBM, the
French state authorities were enjoined to make
'unrestrained use of their trump card, which is to
decree'. As a result, the pioneering role in this
telematics scenario was alloted not to the market, but
to the French state. The DGT eagerly embraced these
proposals for a major state-led initiative for a number
of reasons. In the first place, the DGT saw telematics
as an opportunity to enhance its own authority and
also as a means of achieving its objective of becoming
an independent state-owned enterprise. Equally
important, the DOT had become acutely conscious of
the need for its suppliers to exploit new markets once
the 1975-80 network expansion programme had
peaked and, therefore, telematics seemed an ideal way
forward in this respect. What eventually emerged from
these pressures was the Plan Télématique of 1978,
inaugurating bold initiatives in such fields as videotex,
teletext and an electronic directory, facsimile, a
communications satellite and an experiment in optical
fibres (at Biarritz) offering broadband facilities.
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With the launch of the telematics programme, the
DGT propelled itself into activities that extended well
beyond its traditional operations which, until then,
had been confined to the telephone network. As if to
affirm its new ambitions, the DGT set about
estalishing a network of majority-owned subsidiaries,
established under private law, and therefore outside
the conventional restraints of the administration.
These subsidiaries were seen as a flexible means of
coping with rapidly changing markets and technology.
Nevertheless, what the DGT did not sufficiently
appreciate was that the telematics project did not lend
itself to a state-led strategy in the way that network
modernisation in the 1970s so manifestly did. Indeed,
the telematics venture was a good deal more
precarious because of greater technological and
market uncertainties. But, as important, whereas the
DGT's remit clearly covered network development,
the division of labour for telematics - between the
DGl, equipment manufacturers and information
vendors - was ill-defined and a source of conflict
[Ergas 1983]. Furthermore, as a state-led strategy
from 'above', it was not entirely surprising that the
DGT's telematics programme encountered both
market opposition (in the shape of demand
constraints in facsimile, videotex and the 'minitel'
electronics directory) and political opposition.
Towards the end of the Giscard presidency the DGT
incurred criticisms - from both left and right - of the
authoritarian manner in which programmes were
introduced without sufficient parliamentary debate
and with too little respect for individual liberty. What
best illustrated this authoritarianism was the experience
in St Malo, where inhabitants were provided with free,
but compulsory, minitels. Overall, and somewhat
paradoxically perhaps, the apex of the DGT's power
was reached in the late Giscard period. even though it
appeared to have a greater stature under the socialists
after 1981.
With the advent of the Mitterrand Presidency in 1981
the position of the DGT changed in two important
ways: (i) the DGT's profits began to be tapped for
general budgetary purposes and (ii) the DOT was
reluctantly obliged to finance parts of the filière
electronique. If the stature of the DGT appeared to
have grown under the socialists, its autonomy, as
measured by its access to and control over funds, had
been substantially eroded. However, apart from these
changes (and those associated with nationalisation
and mergers) the Mitterrand government endorsed
most of the pre-existing telematics strategy. Indeed in
1982 the boldest programme of all was announced,
namely, the decision to cable France with optical
fibres for the transmission of voice, text and video.
This daring, state-led programme was a fiercely
contested affair in and beyond the DGT, largely as a
result of the high cost of optical fibre cable. Well
before the new Chirac government jettisoned the Plan
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Cable, the DOT had already begun to abandon its
original vision [Lacan 1987].
Despite such grand public ventures the Mitterrand
government's faith in state-led growth palpably waned
as time wore on. The austerity plans of 1982 and 1983
signalled the end of the government's early ambition
to achieve 'growth-in-one-country'. Balance of
payments problems and burgeoning deficits in leading
nationalised firms like Thomson, CGCT and Bull, led
to a backlash in favour of financial rectitude,
particularly with respect to the nationalised sector.
Thereafter the government became less enamoured of
state-led initiatives and, instead, began to emphasise
the merits of the firm, as in Mitterrand's classic 1984
declaration: 'c'est l'enterprise qui crée la richesse'. One
of the major beneficiaries of this U-turn was the
supposedly publicly-controlled CGE. Not only was it
able to exploit its near monopoly supply position with
the DGl, having successfully defeated the DGT's
earlier opposition to the merger between Alcatel and
Thomson, but it began to make corporate alliances
without informing its political 'masters'. The alliance
between CGE and ITT seems to have been presented
to the government as a fait accompli. Another of
CGE's alliances, with AT+T, has been awaiting
political approval for nearly three years, largely
because the deal initially involved AT+T taking over
the ailing CGCT and the Mitterrand regime, keen to
promote European alliances, was reluctant to admit a
US firm into the French market. Here, however, the
socialist government faced a DGT which was more
and more disposed towards AT+T, partly because
AT+T offered the best technology.
A further source of ignominy for the Mitterrand
government concerned the employment front. Back in
the euphoric days of 1981 the government was itself
responsible for encouraging high, and thus fragile,
expectations about potential employment growth in
telecommunications. But with the precocious
development of telecommunications in the 1970s caine
over-capacity, a problem that has been accentuated
with the merger between Alcatel and Thomson. In
fact, employment has been falling since the late 1970s
as a result of strong productivity increases and the
peaking of network expansion. In this context, from a
trade-union perspective, the CFDT sees deregulation
as a further threat to employment and is, therefore,
totally opposed to it, and to any infringement of the
DGl's monopoly. However, major redundancies
have been declared at both Alcatel and Thomson,
reinforcing a point made in the British context,
namely, that jobs are under siege in telecommuni-
cations, irrespective of deregulation.
The experience of French telecommunications over
the past 15 years illustrates the scope for, as well as the
limits of, a state-led strategy. The DOT's successful
reputation derives essentially from the 1970s: it
depended upon a strong political commitment to a
huge investment programme, involving public pro-
curement in a protected national market for basic
network equipment. However, the current decade is
not so conducive to such a strategy because both
markets and technology are less stable and, crucially.
public-sector ordering is a declining proportion of
total demand. Although the French socialists
condemned deregulation in the US and Britain as
politically motivated disruption, France had already
discovered that it could not totally immunise itself
from pressures outside its borders. For example, ici
response to transatlantic price-cutting, the DGT felt
obliged to reduce its tariffs to North America, and it is
now contemplating a 're-balancing' of its internal
tariffs with a view to increasing local charges. This
situation amounts to what the DGT once referred to
as 'imported' deregulation. Well before the advent ofa
right-wing government the DGT was already
considering some modest forms of deregulation, but it
remained cautious and pragmatic. As its former
director put it: 'If no problems of hegemony are
involved, we are prepared to deregulate. But if we see
that the only consequence of deregulation is to allow
the American computer industry to make profits at the
expense of the French industry, then we regulate'
(Financial Times, 1 February 1985).
In stark contrast to Britain, the DGT has sought
European cooperation in the field of deregulation
because it feels that unilateral moves in this direction
might degenerate into an 'anarchic process' [Dondoux
1985].
The narrow victory of the neo-Gaullist RPR and the
Giscardian UDF at the 1986 Parliamentary elections
brought with it the possibility of more far-reaching
steps towards denationalisation of the major tele-
communications firms and deregulation of the
telecommunications market. The RPR and UDF won
the election on a programme which espoused both
these objectives. Certainly, it seems that the new
government will privatise Thomson and CGE. But
leading figures in the Socialist Party (such as Fabius
and Rocard) had been expressing support for limited
denationalisation as a means of relieving the burden
on an indebted state of raising the funds needed by the
state-owned groups. It would seem that the 'dirigiste'
tradition has lost its appeal to the major parties in
France. However, it remains to be seen how far the
RPR/UDF government will go in deregulating
telecommunications. One year on from its electoral
victory little real progress towards deregulation had
been made beyond the sphere of rhetoric. I'recedent
suggests that a government of the French Right, with
its much stronger sense of industrial patriotism, would
not pursue as radical a policy in this regard as the
Thatcher government in Britain.
Conclusions
The very different careers of the public monopolies in
Britain and France show that a good deal of political
discretion accompanies even the most radical
technological changes. In retrospect the public
monopoly was breached with remarkable ease in
Britain: its poor performance and its ponderous,
bureaucratic procedures had left it with few allies. In
contrast, the DGT had become something of a
'superstar' administration as a result of its crash
modernisation programme in the l970s. Even though
this reputation became tarnished by the U-turn over
the Plan Cable, the DGT could still point to a record
of high productivity and commendable product
innovation, with the result that it was seen as an
'instructive example of a flexible ... and innovative
response by a public telecom entity to the challenges of
a new era in the telecommunications field' [Bruce et al.
1986]. The public monopolies in France and Germany
may well be curtailed somewhat in the near future, but
there is little prospect of them being broken to the
same extent as in Britain. There is even less chance of
them being privatised.
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